Tuesday, March 6, 2018

Hearsay is generally admissible in a VOP hearing State v. Mosley App. Div.

Hearsay is generally admissible in a VOP hearing
State v. Mosley App. Div.

Hearsay is generally admissible in a VOP hearing. When assessing the State’s ability to rely on hearsay to satisfy its proof obligation without contravening a defendant’s due process rights, a court fundamentally should consider the State’s reasons for relying on hearsay forms of evidence and the reliability of the evidence for its proposed purpose. In this matter, the State failed to provide any justification for relying on hearsay, and the hearsay evidence was not sufficiently reliable for its asserted purpose of substantiating the new criminal charges against defendant. A-24-16;

Monday, March 5, 2018

2C :17-1 . Arson and related offenses.

2C :17-1 . Arson and related offenses.
    a.  Aggravated arson. A person is guilty of aggravated arson, a crime of the second degree, if he starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or another's:

   (1)  Thereby purposely or knowingly placing another person in danger of death or bodily injury; or

   (2)  With the purpose of destroying a building or structure of another; or

   (3)  With the purpose of collecting insurance for the destruction or damage to such property under circumstances which recklessly place any other person in danger of death or bodily injury; or

   (4) With the purpose of destroying or damaging a structure in order to exempt the structure, completely or partially, from the provisions of any State, county or local zoning, planning or building law, regulation, ordinance or enactment under circumstances which recklessly place any other person in danger of death or bodily injury; or

   (5) With the purpose of destroying or damaging any forest.

   b.  Arson. A person is guilty of arson, a crime of the third degree, if he purposely starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or another's:

   (1)  Thereby recklessly placing another person in danger of death or bodily injury; or

   (2)  Thereby recklessly placing a building or structure of another in danger of damage or destruction; or

   (3)  With the purpose of collecting insurance for the destruction or damage to such property; or

   (4) With the purpose of destroying or damaging a structure in order to exempt the structure, completely or partially, from the provisions of any State, county or local zoning, planning or building law, regulation, ordinance or enactment; or

   (5) Thereby recklessly placing a forest in danger of damage or destruction.

   c.  Failure to control or report dangerous fire.  A person who knows that a fire is endangering life or a substantial amount of property of another and either fails to take reasonable measures to put out or control the fire, when he can do so without substantial risk to himself, or to give prompt fire alarm, commits a crime of the fourth degree if:

   (1)  He knows that he is under an official, contractual, or other legal duty to prevent or combat the fire; or

   (2)  The fire was started, albeit lawfully, by him or with his assent, or on property in his custody or control.

   d.  Any person who, directly or indirectly, pays or accepts or offers to pay or accept any form of consideration including, but not limited to, money or any other pecuniary benefit, regardless of whether any consideration is actually exchanged for the purpose of starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of this section commits a crime of the first degree.

   e.  Notwithstanding the provisions of any section of this Title to the contrary, if a person is convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to the provisions of subsection a. of this section and the structure which was the target of the offense was a health care facility or a physician's office, the sentence imposed shall include a term of imprisonment.  The court may not suspend or make any other noncustodial disposition of a person sentenced pursuant to the provisions of this subsection.

   f.  Definitions.  "Structure" is defined in section 2C :18-1. Property is that of another, for the purpose of this section, if any one other than the actor has a possessory, or legal or equitable proprietary interest therein.  Property is that of another for the purpose of this section, if anyone other than the actor has a legal or equitable interest in the property including, but not limited to, a mortgage, pledge, lien or security interest therein.  If a building or structure is divided into separately occupied units, any unit not occupied by the actor is an occupied structure of another.  
 
   As used in this section, "forest" means and includes any forest, brush land, grass land, salt marsh, wooded area and any combination thereof, including but not limited to, an open space area, public lands, wetlands, park lands, natural habitats, a State conservation area, a wildlife refuge area or any other designated undeveloped open space whether or not it is subject to specific protection under law.

   As used in this section, "health care facility" means health care facility as defined in section 2 of P.L.1971, c.136 (C.26:2H-2).

   g.  Notwithstanding the provisions of any section of this Title to the contrary, if a person is convicted pursuant to the provisions of  subsection a., b. or d. of this section and the structure which was the target of the offense was a church, synagogue, temple or other place of public worship, that person commits a crime of the first degree and the sentence imposed shall include a term of imprisonment.  The term of imprisonment shall include a minimum term of 15 years, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. The court may not suspend or make any other noncustodial disposition of a person sentenced pursuant to the provisions of this subsection.

    L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.29; 1981, c.290, s.16; 1991, c.498; 1997, c.108; 1997, c.109.

2C :14-13 Short title

1.   P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.) shall be known and may be cited as the "Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015."

   L.2015, c.147, s.1.

REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT WORKING GROUP ON PRIVATE CITIZEN COMPLAINTS IN THE MUNICIPAL COURTS - PUBLICATION FOR COMMENT

NOTICE TO THE BAR
REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT WORKING GROUP ON
PRIVATE CITIZEN COMPLAINTS IN THE MUNICIPAL COURTS -
PUBLICATION FOR COMMENT
The Supreme Court invites written comments on the December 2017 Report of the
Working Group on Private Citizen Complaints in the Municipal Courts. The report is
published with this notice. The full report, including its several appendices, is available on
the Judiciary's internet web site at http://www.njcourts.gov/courts/supreme/reports.html.
Please send any comments on the report in writing by April 2, 2018 to:
Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D.
Acting Administrative Director of the Courts
Comments on Private Citizen Complaints Report
Hughes Justice Complex; P.O. Box 037
Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0037
Comments on the report may also be submitted by e-mail to the following address:
Comments.Mailbox@njcourts.gov.
The Supreme Court created the Working Group to make recommendations on the
following questions: (1) Should private citizen complaints continue to be accepted by the
Municipal Courts?; (2) Should limitations be placed on the types of matters for which a private
citizen complaint can be filed and/or against whom?; (3) Should some form of screening, either
by law enforcement or some other form, be required prior to a judicial officer making a probable
cause determination?
The Working Group focused on R. 7:2-1 (b) ("Acceptance of Complaint"), which provides
that "[t]he municipal court administrator or deputy court administrator shall accept for filing
every complaint made by any person." There has not been an examination of the requirement
to accept all citizen complaints since 1988. The Working Group's discussions centered "on the
acceptance of the complaint by the Municipal Court and the process that occurs before the
Complaint-Warrant or summons is issued." The Working Group's recommendations, set forth in
more detail in the report, are as follows:
Recommendation 1 {Substantive Rule Amendment): Every complaint made
by any person should continue to be accepted for filing, however R. 7:2-1 (b)
and R. 3:2-1 (a) should be amended to clarify that mere acceptance of the
complaint for filing does not mean that a finding of probable cause has been
made or that the Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) or summons has been issued.
Recommendation 2 {Clarifying/Housekeeping Rule Amendments): R. 7:2-
2(a)(1) should be amended to remove the reference to dismissing a complaint
where a judge finds no probable cause or where the statutory time limitation
1
to issue a Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) or summons has expired. Instead, the
judge should be directed to not issue the Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) or
summons. Where a no probable cause finding is made and a ComplaintWarrant
or summons does not issue, the complaint should not be kept in a
held status. In addition, duplicative rule language should be removed and an
incorrect cross-reference should be corrected.
Recommendation 3 (Substantive Rule Amendment): New subparagraphs
should be created at the beginning of R. 7:2-2 that clearly define probable
cause. For purposes of clarity, the rule should be restructured so that
probable cause is no longer buried in R. 7:2-2(a)(1 ). In addition, a crossreference
to the current exceptions to finding probable cause (i.e., law
enforcement summons on complaint and code enforcement officer summons
on a complaint) should be added.
Recommendation 4 (Substantive Rule Amendment): R. 7:2-2(a)(1) should be
amended to provide that a judge or authorized municipal court administrator
or deputy court administrator Oudicial officer) may issue a Complaint-Warrant
(CDR-2) or a summons charging a disorderly persons offense, petty
disorderly persons offense or any other non-disorderly persons offense within
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court made by a private citizen. In addition,
the rule should add a provision that a judge only may issue a CDR-2 or
summons charging any indictable offense made by a private citizen.
Recommendation 5 (Substantive Rule Amendment): R. 7:2-2 should be
amended to provide that prior to issuance, the Complaint-Warrant or
summons must be reviewed by a county prosecutor on private citizen
complaints charging disorderly persons offenses against a: (i) party official or
public servant as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:27-1(e) and (g); (ii) a candidate or
nominee for public office as defined in N.J.S.A. 19:1-1; or (iii) a judicial
nominee. The county prosecutor can either approve ( decide to move forward
with the matter), disapprove (decide to not pursue charges/prosecute matter),
or modify the charge.
Recommendation 6 (Substantive Rule Amendment): R. 7:2-2 should be
amended to provide that prior to issuance, the Complaint-Warrant or
summons must be reviewed by a county prosecutor on private citizen
complaints charging any indictable offense against any individual. The county
prosecutor can either approve ( decide to move forward with the matter),
disapprove (decide to not pursue charges/prosecute matter), or modify the
charge. Part Ill rules should mirror the Part VII proposed rule amendments
on indictables.
Recommendation 7 (Clarifying Amendment): R. 7:2-2 should be amended to
clarify that a CDR-2 or summons charging any offense made by a private
citizen may be issued if it appears from the complaint, affidavit, certification,
citizen complaint information form, or testimony that there is probable cause.
The finding of probable cause shall be noted on the face of the CDR-2 or
2
summons and confirmed by the judicial officer's signature.
Recommendation 8 (Clarifying Amendment): R. 7:3-1(c)(1) should be
amended to correct a cross reference to R. 7:2-2. R. 7:3-1 (c)(2) should also
be amended to align with the proposed amendment to R. 7:2-2(a)(1)
(Recommendation 2) that removes the reference to dismissing the summons
or Complaint-Warrant where there is no probable cause. Instead, the
summons or Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) shall not be issued.
The Supreme Court will not consider comments submitted anonymously. Thus,
those submitting comments by mail should include their name and address (and those
submitting comments by e-mail should include their name and e-mail address).
Comments are subject to public disclosure upon receipt.
Gfenn A. Grant, J.A. D. '
Acting Administrative Director of the Courts
Dated: February 20, 2018

3

2C :33-4.1 Crime of cyber-harassment.

2C :33-4.1  Crime of cyber-harassment
   1. a. A person commits the crime of cyber-harassment if, while making a communication in an online capacity via any electronic device or through a social networking site and with the purpose to harass another, the person:

   (1)   threatens to inflict injury or physical harm to any person or the property of any person;

   (2)   knowingly sends, posts, comments, requests, suggests, or proposes any lewd, indecent, or obscene material to or about a person with the intent to emotionally harm a reasonable person or place a reasonable person in fear of physical or emotional harm to his person; or

   (3)   threatens to commit any crime against the person or the person's property.

   b.   Cyber-harassment is a crime of the fourth degree, unless the person is 21 years of age or older at the time of the offense and impersonates a minor for the purpose of cyber-harassing a minor, in which case it is a crime of the third degree.

   c.   If a minor under the age of 16 is adjudicated delinquent for cyber-harassment, the court may order as a condition of the sentence that the minor, accompanied by a parent or guardian, complete, in a satisfactory manner, one or both of the following:

   (1)   a class or training program intended to reduce the tendency toward cyber-harassment behavior; or

   (2)   a class or training program intended to bring awareness to the dangers associated with cyber-harassment.

   d.   A parent or guardian who fails to comply with a condition imposed by the court pursuant to subsection c. of this section is a disorderly person and shall be fined not more than $25 for a first offense and not more than $100 for each subsequent offense.

   L.2013, c.272, s.1.

Tuesday, February 27, 2018

2C:33-2.1 Loitering to Obtain or Distribute CDS drugs

2C:33-2.1 Loitering to Obtain or Distribute CDS drugs
Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.
Loitering to obtain or distribute CDS 2C:33-2.1.
"Public place" defined; Loitering to obtain or distribute CDS is a disorderly persons offense 1. a. As used in this section:
"Public place" means any place to which the public has access, including but not limited to a public street, road, thoroughfare, sidewalk, bridge, alley, plaza, park, recreation or shopping area, public transportation facility, vehicle used for public transportation, parking lot, public library or any other public building, structure or area.
More info at http://www.njlaws.com/loitering_to_obtain_or_distribute_cds.htm
b. A person, whether on foot or in a motor vehicle, commits a disorderly persons offense if (1) he wanders, remains or prowls in a public place with the purpose of unlawfully obtaining or distributing a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog; and (2) engages in conduct that, under the circumstances, manifests a purpose to obtain or distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.
c. Conduct that may, where warranted under the circumstances, be deemed adequate to manifest a purpose to obtain or distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog includes, but is not limited to, conduct such as the following:
(1) Repeatedly beckoning to or stopping pedestrians or motorists in a public place;
(2) Repeatedly passing objects to or receiving objects from pedestrians or motorists in a public place;
(3) Repeatedly circling in a public place in a motor vehicle and on one or more occasions passing any object to or receiving any object from a person in a public place.
d. The element of the offense described in paragraph (1) of subsection b. of this section may not be established solely by proof that the actor engaged in the conduct that is used to satisfy the element described in paragraph (2) of subsection b. of this section.
Consequences of a Criminal conviction

1 You will have a criminal record
2 You may go to Jail or Prison.
3. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.
4. You could be put on Probation for up to five years.
5. You must wait 3-5  years to expunge a first offense. 2C:52-3
6. In Drug Cases, a mandatory DEDR penalty of $500-$1,000, and lose your driver's license for 6 months - 2years.
7 When you are on Probation or Parole, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail.
8. You may be required to do Community Service.
9 You lose the presumption against incarceration in future cases. 2C:44-10 You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution.
10. Future employers may not hire you because you have a criminal record. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty and may be barred from any future city, state, federal or school employment
11. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be removed/deported by virtue of your plea of guilty or prevented from citizenship.

       The defense of a person charged with a criminal offense is not impossible. There are a number of viable defenses and arguments which can be pursued to achieve a successful result. Advocacy, commitment, and persistence are essential to defending a client accused of a criminal offense.

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal, drug offenses, and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Our office helps people with traffic/ municipal court tickets including drivers charged with Driving While Intoxicated, Refusal and Driving While Suspended.

Kenneth Vercammen was the NJ State Bar Municipal Court Attorney of the Year and past president of the Middlesex County Municipal Prosecutors Association.

Criminal and Motor vehicle violations can cost you.  Don't give up! The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal motor vehicle violations.

When your job or drivers license is in jeopardy or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, DMV surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Schedule an appointment if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter.

Our website www.njlaws.com provides information on traffic offenses we can be retained to represent people. Our website also provides details on jail terms for traffic violations and car insurance eligibility points. Car insurance companies increase rates or drop customers based on moving violations.
Contact the Law Office of
Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C.
at 732-572-0500
for an appointment.
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817


2C:20-4 . Theft by deception.

2C:20-4 .  Theft by deception.
   A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by deception.  A person deceives if he purposely:

   a.   Creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as  to law, value, intention or other state of mind, and including, but not limited to, a false impression that the person is soliciting or collecting funds for a charitable purpose;  but deception as to a person's intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise;

   b.   Prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his judgment of a transaction;  or

   c.   Fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.

   The term "deceive" does not, however, include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing or exaggeration by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed.

Sunday, February 4, 2018

Ethics Marketing photo 2017 Speakers: Ken A. Vercammen, Esq. Jason T. Komninos, Esq. Shanna McCann,.Esq. Marc Garfinkle, Esq.


Ethics Marketing photo 2017 Speakers:
Ken A. Vercammen, Esq.
Jason T. Komninos, Esq.

Shanna McCann,.Esq.
 Marc Garfinkle, Esq.
January 30, 2017
New Jersey Law Center
1 Constitution Sq. New Brunswick, NJ 08901
5:30 PM - 8:30 PM ET

Learn how to make more money by ethically marketing your practice...
and staying ethically compliant!

This program will demonstrate proven techniques for promoting your practice while staying within the ethics rules whether you handle cases in Municipal Court or in other areas of law.

Topics include:
• An overview of the ethics of marketing - a discussion of information that is
and is not permitted to be communicated to potential clients. An overview of
relevant RPC’s , ethics opinions and cases that refer to ethical
communication with potential clients, including Opinion 39, 42 and 43 and
RPC 7.1.
• Ethical websites - do’s and dont’s as to how your website can attract the
most clients while staying within the ethics rules. Topics will include imagery,
testimonials and design.
The Ethical Considerations of Social Networking - a focus on how to
ethically grow your practice through on-line networking.
• The Ethical Considerations of In-Person Networking - This will review what
you can and can’t say in person, conflicts of interest and more.
• Blogs, Event Calendars, Articles and Other Types of Promotion - Some
proven techniques for marketing and rainmaking that go beyond the
conventional but stay within the ethics boundaries. ...and more!

Speakers:
Ken A. Vercammen, Esq.
Jason T. Komninos, Esq.

Shanna McCann,.Esq.
 Marc Garfinkle, Esq.

Audio cd available from NJICLE NJ Institute for Continuing Legal Education
A Division of the NJSBA
Phone: (732) 214-8500   CustomerService@njsba.com
NJSBA & NJSBA Section/Committee members are eligible for
special discounts - login to see your discounted rate for this program.
     

Presented in cooperation with the NJSBA Senior Lawyers Special Committee