TERRORISTIC THREATS
(N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a)) model jury charge
Count of the
indictment charges defendant with committing [a] terroristic threat[s].
[READ COUNT OF INDICTMENT]
That
section of our statutes provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty
of a crime if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to
[CHOOSE
APPLICABLE ALTERNATIVE]
terrorize another or in reckless disregard of the risk of
causing such terror
OR
cause evacuation of a building,
place of assembly or facility of public transportation or in reckless disregard
of the risk of causing such evacuation
OR
otherwise to cause serious public
inconvenience or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such
inconvenience.
In order to convict defendant of the charge, the State
must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. That the
defendant threatened to commit a crime of violence.
2. That the threat was made
with the purpose to
[CHOOSE APPLICABLE ALTERNATIVE]
terrorize another or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such
terror
OR
cause
evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public
transportation or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation
OR
otherwise
to cause serious public inconvenience or in reckless disregard of the risk of
causing such inconvenience.
The first element that the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt is that defendant threatened to commit any crime of
violence. The State alleges that
defendant threatened to commit the violent crime of .[1] The words or actions of the defendant must be
of such a nature as to convey menace or fear of a crime of violence to the
ordinary person. It is not a violation
of this statute if the threat expresses fleeting anger or was made merely to
alarm.[2]
The second element
that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the threat was made
with the purpose to
[CHOOSE
APPLICABLE ALTERNATIVE]
terrorize
another or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror. In this case, the State alleges that defendant
intended to terrorize (name of victim).
The State need not prove that the victim actually was terrorized.
OR
to
cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public
transportation or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such
evacuation. In this case, the State
alleges that defendant intended to cause the evacuation of (name of
location). The State need not prove that
there actually was an evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility
of public transportation.
OR
to
cause serious public inconvenience or in reckless disregard of the risk of
causing such inconvenience. In this
case, the State alleges that defendant intended to cause serious public
inconvenience by (set forth allegation).
The State need not prove that there actually was serious public
inconvenience.
A person acts purposely with respect
to the nature of his/her conduct
or a result thereof if it is his/her
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result. A person acts purposely with
respect to attendant circumstances if the individual is aware of the existence
of such circumstances or the individual believes or hopes that they exist. “With purpose,” “designed,” “with design” or
equivalent terms have the same meaning.
A person
acts recklessly with respect to the result of his/her
conduct if he/she consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the result will occur from his/her
conduct. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to the actor, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor’s situation. One is
said to act recklessly if one acts with recklessness, with scorn for the
consequences, heedlessly, or foolhardily.
The terms
purposely and recklessly are conditions of the mind. A condition of the mind cannot be seen. It can only be determined by inference from
defendant’s conduct, words or acts. A
state of mind is rarely susceptible of direct proof but must ordinarily be inferred
from the facts. Therefore, it is not
necessary that the State produce witnesses to testify that an accused said that
he/she had a certain state of mind when he/she did a particular thing.
It is within your power to find that such proof has been furnished
beyond a reasonable doubt by inference which may arise from the nature of his/her
acts and conduct and from all he/she said and did at the particular time and place and from all
surrounding circumstances established by the evidence.
If
you find that the State has proven all the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. If, however, you find that the State has
failed to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
defendant not guilty.
[CHARGE
IF APPLICABLE]
If the State has proven defendant guilty of committing [a] terroristic
threat[s], then you must further determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the threat was made during a
declared period of (choose appropriate) national, State or county emergency. In this case, the State alleges that when
defendant’s threat was made,
had declared a period of
emergency. It is no defense to the
charge that the defendant did not
know that there was a declared period of emergency at the time the crime occurred.
If you find
that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a terroristic threat and that
the offense occurred during a declared period of national, State or county
emergency, then you must find defendant guilty of committing a terroristic
threat during a declared period of emergency.
If you find that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed a terroristic threat but
find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred during a
declared period of national, State or county emergency, then you must find defendant not guilty of committing a terroristic
threat during a declared period of emergency.